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THE STATUS-TO-CONTRACT THEORY QUESTIONED
Ever since Sir Henry Maine wrote his Ancient Law (186i)
it has been a commonplace among jurists-and some who are
not jurists-that "the movement of progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from status to contract." The formula
has generally been gratefully accepted as a very useful summary
of many phenomena encountered in legal history. Usually, its
original meaning is extended so as to embrace within the concept
of "status" the immediate or the remote results of agreement.
Now and then the formula has been modified or limited," or
exceptions to it have been noted;2 then the universality of the
doctrines began to be questioned ;3 and finally its applicability to
Anglo-American law has been categorically denied. In Dean
Roscoe Pound's latest contribution to his forthcoming Sociolog-
ical Jurisprudence we read:
"But Maine's generalization as it is commonly under-
stood shows only the course of evolution of Roman law.
It has no basis in Anglo-American legal history, and the
whole course of .English and American law to-day is
belying it unless, indeed, we are progressing backward."'
The issue framed by this flat contradiction is one of fact.
Viewed as an event in the history of Anglo-American juristic
thought, this rejection of a fundamental concept in current juris-
prudence is no mere academic quibble. The position taken by
Dean Pound seems an essential part of the groundwork of his
sociological jurisprudence. Thus, he remarks upon the sig-
nificance of
"the legislative development whereby duties and liabili-
ties are imposed on the employer in the relation of
'Thus, Edward Jenks in Law and Politics in the Middle Ages (i897)
speaks of "Caste and Contract." See Chapter VII.
'E. g. by William G. Miller, Lectures on the Philosophy of Law (1884)
73, quoted in 3o HAlv. L. REv. 219.
'Sir Frederick Pollock's Note L to Chapter V of Maine's Ancient Law
(i9o6).
'Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought
(1917) 3o HARv. L. REV. 219.
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employer and employee, not because he has so willed, not
because he is at fault, but because the nature of the rela-
tion is deemed to call for it.""
It is not only "significant"; it represents "the settled ten-
dency of the present." For such statutes the new jurisprudence
bespeaks "the sympathetic judicial development which all
statutes require in order to be effective." The new school denies
the soundness of the historical views of those courts that have
been talking of freedom of contract in such matters.
THE DOCTRINE APPLICABLE UNTIL MAINE'S DAY
Now what is the fact? Is there indeed "no basis in Anglo-
American legal history" for the status-to-contract theory as gen-
erally understood? Its original application was to personal
relations derived from or colored by the powers and privileges
anciently residing in the family. Is it not true that the relation
of master and servant was originally-and still is nominally-a
domestic relation? And whether the nineteenth century was out
of line with the common law or not, is it not a fact that it has
made of this relation a contractual one? "Employer" and
"employee" (words having reference to the contract) now seem
more appropriate terms than the older "master" and "servant"
(words having reference to status). 6 What of the relation of
principal and agent? Historically, the making of this relation
has not depended on contract. Hence, persons incapable of
making contracts are still competent to become agents. But in
the living law of the last century this relation, too, has veered from
status to contract. The naive statement in many text books and
judicial opinions that "agency is a contract" is evidence of the
tendency, if not of the law.7 Perhaps even the marriage rela-
tion has been made somewhat subject to contract law, at least
on the property side; though, of course, here we should expect
5 bid. Cf. Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract (igog) 18 YALE LAw
JOURNAL 454.
'Thus, 26 Cyc. 968: "The relation of master and servant arises only
out of contract."
72 C. J. 432, Agency as a Contract, quotes Cullinan v. Garfinkle (igo6)
114 App. Div. 509, 512, 99 N. Y. S. iiig, 1121: "Agency is a contract, and
like other contracts, it is essential that the minds of the parties should
meet in making it." Cf. the outline and treatment of the subject in Evans.
Agency (1878) Chap. II, being entitled "The Parties to the Contract."
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more conservatism, and marriage must still be considered a
status." But when we leave the family circle and turn from
the original application of the formula to its possible applications
"as it is commonly understood," it becomes difficult to compre-
hend what is meant when we are told that the generalization has
no basis in Anglo-American legal history. Holmes has shown
the fact, whatever the reason, that the law of bailments was
originally a law of status, and that the nineteenth century has
stretched contract law so as to make a contract even of a
gratuitous bailment.9 Perhaps here the change is in the theory
of the law rather than in the law itself; but what shall we say
of the law of landlord and tenant? Beginning in status as indi-
cated by the terms still used-though "lessor" and "lessee" are
displacing them-it has progressed to the point where every
letting is an agreement of lease. A lease was formerly a con-
veyance of property, an instrument of status.'0 We can even
localize the point where assumpsit was allowed alongside of debt
in the collection of rents.1 Turn to the history of assumpsit.1
2
The early tradesman was there sued as tradesman and not as a
contracting party. We may lament this progress and blame all
our ills upon it,13 if we will, but the fact remains that most busi-
ness relations have become contractual relations,1 4 and-at least
until Maine's day-all business relations had shown a tendency
in that direction. In the law of negotiable instruments, the pecu-
liar rights and liabilities of the parties were connected with the
status of being a trader until Lord Holt declared that the "gen-
'A score or more of our states have statutes declaring marriage "a
civil contract," having reference rather to the inception of the relation
than to its incidents. Cf. Sheldon Amos, The Science of Law (x88o)
217: "It is obvious from this investigation, as has been already indicated,
that marriage has a tendency to glide into a mere contract." Even in
guardianship, the element of consent now plays an important part.
'0. W. Holmes, The Common Law (i88r) Lecture V.
"' The current definitions of a lease shift between the ideas of a con-
veyance and of a contract. For a collection of them see 24 Cyc. 894.
'For the Elizabethan cases showing the transition, see 2 Gray's Cases
on Property (2d ed.) 571 ff.
"Cf. James Barr Ames, The History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HAv. L.
REv. 1, 53, reprinted in 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History
(i909) 259-303.
"Cf. Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence (I914) 28 HAv. L.
REv. 135, 147 ff. See my note in 23 JouRN. POL. EcON. 553, 554.
"Ibid. 5s5.
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tleman" who signed a negotiable document became ad hoc a
trader.15  The basis thereafter was agreement. But more sig-
nificant, because deeper, than the changes in particular branches
of the law, has been the development of the general theory of
implied contract. This is illustrated in the history of possessory
liens. The presence or absence of a lien has come imperceptibly
to depend on the implied contract. Of course, the terms of the
implied contract are to be sought in usage; but there was a time
when usage merely dictated a list of bailees whose status entitled
them to liens of one kind or another without the mediation of any
theory of implied contract1 8
Maine was, of course, no prophet. He could not foresee the
twentieth century tendency of our law to go back to the Year
Books, but as a shrewd observer of the tendencies about him,
he was unsurpassed. At least, with reference to his status-to-
contract generalization, whatever limitations we shall have to
insert, whatever exceptions we shall be forced to engraft on the
rule, we must-however reluctantly-dissent from the view that
it was a mere Romanism with "no basis in Anglo-American legal
history." Here is poetic justice, indeed. Maine, who falsely
accused Bratton of foisting Roman law on his unsuspecting
countrymen, is now charged with having foisted Roman juris-
prudence on his still unsuspecting countrymen!
THE PRESENT TENDENCY A REACTION
Still, if Maine's observations of the past were correct, the
present tendency is clearly a reaction in the opposite direction.
Dean Pound enumerates, besides the instance of the workmen's
' Witherly v. Sarsfeild (1687) i Shower 127, sub nor. Sarsfield v.
Witherly, Carthew 82.
"' As Ames explains Chapman v. Allen (1632) Cro. Car. 271, the exist-
ence of the lien depended on the absence of a contract. In 1794 Lord
Kenyon said that liens were either by common law, usage, or agreement.
Naylor v. Mangles, I Esp. io9. A few years later (i8o6) in Rushforth v.
Hadfield, 7 East *224, *230, one of the judges said arguendo, "And it is
admitted that the question . . . was properly left to the jury, .
if the usage for the carriers . . . were so general as that they must
conclude that these parties contracted with the knowledge and adoption
of such usage." Usage is brought under the head of agreement. It is
only one more step to say (as is done e. g. in 25 Cyc. 663) that liens can
be created only by a contract express or implied, and to look upon the
lien given to an innkeeper by a wrongdoer as an exception based on public
policy.
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compensation acts, those of public service companies, insurance,
and surety companies. We may add many other cases, not only
those in which the statute book says "any contract to the con-
trary notwithstanding," but also those in which it prescribes the
terms of a relation only in the absence of a specific agreement
to the contrary. In fact, because of the constitutional limitations
which we inherit from the days of freedom of contract," the
second class of provisions is still the more important check on
the tendency that seemed to be making every contract a law unto
itself. In ordinary transactions, people cannot or will not stop to
make special agreements "to the contrary." Therefore, they
find themselves governed by the statute with its prescribed insur-
ance policy, its prescribed bill of lading, warehouse receipt,
stock-transfer, negotiable instrument, articles of partnership, its
prescribed type of sale. When the question arises whether title
has passed to a buyer, they will find the answer in the mechanical
T Some of the greatest legal battles of the day are being fought over
statutory collisions with the principle of freedom of contract. The issue
was clearly put by one of the more conservative judges: "In the privilege
of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding and
selling property must be embraced the right to make all proper contracts
in relation thereto." Yet "this right to contract in relation to persons or
property or to do business within the jurisdiction of the state may be
regulated and sometimes prohibited when the contracts or business con-
flict with the policy of the state as contained in its statutes." Peckham, J.,
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 591, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 432,
41 L. Ed. 832, 836. Just how far courts will go in their respect for such
public policy is a question of degree, depending in the final analysis on the
trend of the times towards status or contract. The recent tendency to
extend the police power in defiance of the idea of liberty of contract is
well illustrated in Professor Felix Frankfurter's paper on Hours of Labor
and Realism in Constitutional Law (1916) 29 HAv. L. REv. 353. To the
decisions there enumerated should be added, perhaps as a climax, Bunting
v. Oregon (April 9, 1917) 37 Sup. Ct 435, which he succeeded in
saving from a reversal in a divided Supreme Court. Other interesting
contributions to the literature of the "apologetics of the police power"
in this connection are: Ernst Freund, Limitation of Hours of Labor and
the Federal Supreme Court (195o) 17 GREEN BAG, 411; Constitutional
Limitations and Labor Legislation (19o) 4 IL.. L. REv. 6o9, 622; Learned
Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day (igo8) 21 HAv. L.
REv. 495; Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract (i9o) 18 YAIE LAW
JOURNAL 454; Edward S. Corwin, Social Insurance and Constitutional
Limitations (917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL 431. Several interesting papers
in the recent periodicals touch on the subject in connection with the
Adamson law and the Supreme Court's decision upholding it.
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rules of the code fbr the ascertainment of their "intention," a
constructive intention. The effect is a making of contracts in
wholesale lots, just as we now make corporations in wholesale
lots. A practical check on the individuality of contracts, if not
a theoretical limitation on the freedom of contract, and a
standardization of legal relations, are the net results.
DEGREES OF STANDARDIZING OF RELATIONS
After all, the question is not so much one of status and con-
tract as it is of a broader classification that embraces these con-
cepts: standardized relations and individualized relations.'8 In
what Maine calls status, that is, the ancient family relations, or
caste, the rights, privileges, powers and immunities (and the
correlative duties, limitations, liabilities, and disabilities)' 9 were
thoroughly standardized. In ascertaining them, the peculiarities
of the individual agreement of individual members of society
were irrelevant. But so are many of the peculiarities of an
agreement ignored in later stages of society where a formal
contract of this or that type results in a more or less standardized
relation. Here, we include not only the early Roman forms of
sale and the old English conveyances of land, but marriage, the
taking up of the feudal relation at other stages in the law, and
the purchase of a standard insurance policy to-day. The point
of likeness is that a relation results in which the details of legal
rights and duties are determined not by reference to the par-
ticular intentions of the parties, but by reference to some standard
set of rules made for them. In origin, these relations are, of
course, contractual; in their workings, they recall the r~gime
of status. Maine's original statement has reference to a classi-
fication on the basis of origins. His argument applies-and is
generally applied-to a classification of relations on the basis
of their workings. In this sense, the difference between status
"* This formula includes more than status and contract relations. Rela-
tions arising ex delicto are more or less "standardized" too. In periods
of strict law, the individual fault plays a smaller part in the creation of
liability than it does in periods of equity-but this is another, though a
parallel, story.
"I am gratefully adopting Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld's eight funda-
mental legal conceptions. See Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAW JouRNA, 16, and (1917) 26
YAL LAw JouRNAL 710. I have made but one verbal change: "limita-
tion" instead of "no-right."
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and contract is not one of kind, but one of degree; and in this
sense there has clearly been a long-enduring tendency in English
law from status to contract, and-in the last two generations-
an equally distinct veering back to status. I now quote Dean
Pound, perhaps with an unintended stressing:
"It is significant that progress in our law of public ser-
vice companies has taken the form of abandonment of
nineteenth century conceptions for doctrines which may
be found in the Year BookS."
20
It is, indeed, significant, not "that the nineteenth century was
out of line with the common law"--for we cannot indict a century
to save the reputation of a theory-but that the twentieth century
is witnessing a reaction back to status. And this is not the first
time that the seismograph of history has made such a record,
nor the first time that it has been ignored as an exception. That
medieval hardening of relations known as feudalism was also, in
its beginnings, a progress from contract to status. And those
whose philosophy of history is a belief in the gradual develop-
ment of liberty through the principle of contract have been forced
to regard feudalism as a pause in human progress, an armistice
in the war between two opposite ideas, status and contract-at
best, a compromise, an exceptional, disturbing element in their
whole scheme.21 Perhaps if we were able to go back to what we
accept as standard family relations, we should find their basis,
too, in the hardening of individual practices into rules. Perhaps
even back of caste there was a progress from the individual
non-standardized conduct to the standardized. In other words,
legal history has room not merely for one single line of progress
in one direction or the other, but for a kind of pendulum move-
ment back and forth between periods of standardization and
periods of individualization.
THE CYCLES OF LEGAL HISTORY
I have elsewhere attempted to develop another of Maine's
generalizations-that of Fictions, Equity and Legislation-by
tracing not only their occurrence, but their recurrence in cycles.
22
20 3o HARv. L. REv. 219.
" Cf. Edward Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, 310.
'"The Law" and the Law of Change (1917) 65 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 659,
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It seems that once every millennium or so the laws of a people
tend to become hardened, its ways standardized. Between suc-
cessive crystallizations or codifications, the instrumentalities of
change enumerated by Maine are resorted to in the order named.
This order is by no means the result of chance. Each instru-
mentality is connected with a particular point of view v fictions
with word-study, the first treatment to which a code is naturally
subjected; equity with the study of principles, a kind of revolt
that comes with the realization that life has progressed too far
since the last codification to permit us to find in the words of the
code an adequate expression of the law of the times; legislation,
with a desire for conscious amendment in which the pretense
that the new rule is in the code, either explicitly or implicitly,
is given up. When the code becomes overburdened with new
material, the time is at hand for a new code, and another cycle
begins. Within historic times Roman-continental law has gone
through two cycles and part of a third ;23 Jewish law has com-
pleted four cycles and part of a fifth ;24 Anglo-American law has
gone through two cycles. A brief survey of the cycles in Anglo-
American history may help us determine the connection, if any,
existing between the recurring of the formal instrumentalities
of change and the recurring of periods of the relative emphasis
of status.
THE CYCLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
The dividing line between the two cycles in Anglo-American
legal history falls about 129o. Though no code in the modern
sense is compiled, codification is in the air.25  Edward I, the
English Justinian, has brought back from the home of his father-
in-law, Alphonso the Wise, the compiler of Las Siete Partidas,
a plan which his lawyers try hard to execute. A deluge of
revisions of Bratton is the result. Besides the books called
Britton and Fet Assever which pretend to speak in the king's




'John Selden, Dissertatio ad Fletam, and Francis Morgan Nichols'
Introduction to Britton (1865) have not yet been superseded for their
accounts of this period. F. W. Maitland's Introduction to the Selden
Society's edition of The Mirror of Justices (1895) and Dr. George E.
Woodbine's account of Bratton MSS. throw considerable light on the
activities of the period.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
long-lost (apparently rediscovered) book that Gilbert of Thorn-
ton was ordered to make. There appeared even a parody on
such books, The Mirror of Justices. But the true crystallization
of English law was in the series of writs that was being closed.
Tracing these writs backward to their source, we find a
generation of legislators giving them their final touch in the first
part of Edward's reign. There are the two Statutes of West-
minster, the Statute of Bigamy, the Statute of Gloucester, the
Statute of Mortmain, the Statute of Merchants, the Statute of
Winchester, the Statute of Quo Warranto and the Statute of
Quia Emptores. The purpose of these statutes, to fill in the gaps
of English law, is best illustrated in that section of the second
Statute of Westminster, which urges the chancellor to make new
writs in new cases resembling the old ones. It is quite apparent
from this statute and from the fact that so little use was made of
it, that the ability of English law to develop on the basis of
magisterial application of general principles had been exhausted.
The barons had objected to new writs in 1:258, and by 1272 the
last of the important writs had been made.
The period of writ-making, the beginnings of which we see
in Glanvil and the highest point of which we find in Bratton,
though not generally called a period of equity, bears, as Jenks
has pointed out,26 a greater resemblance to the praetor's edict
of ancient Rome with its lists of formulae, than do the vague
processes of the early days of our generally recognized equity.
We can literally see law growing when we pick up a writ of
the year 1205 and find in the margin "Hoc breve de cetero erit
de cursu" scrawled in a contemporary hand.
What preceded the growth of law by the making of new writs?
It was an era of legal fictions. The great Norman kings with
all their power had to stoop to this indirect method of tampering
with the people's law. The Conqueror himself pretended to be
the King of England by virtue of that law. He promised the
people of London the advantages of all the laws that they had
enjoyed in King Edward's day. His followers in their charters
likewise promised "leges Edwardi reddere"-to give back the
laws of King Edward the Confessor, an unwritten but still a
tough code. The fictions by which the king's court extended its
jurisdiction are well known. The king's peace became all impor-
tant, and on the theory that this king's peace was involved, the
English Civil Law (1916) 30 HAzv. L. REv. 1, I6.
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king gradually took jurisdiction, not only over the criminal law,
but also over possession in civil law. It was not so easy to
extend the fiction to cases involving questions of ownership as
distinguished from possession. Consequently, possession has
always been nine points of the law, the triumphant royal law, of
England. So completely was the work of transformation done
in the comparatively short cycle between William I and Edward I
that the English lawyer of to-day who ventures beyond Domesday
Book finds himself in a strange land indeed.
From Edward's day forward, on the other hand, we have no
difficulty in discerning the continuity of English law. Beginning
at our turning point, we have the Year Books, those notes of the
happenings in court from term to term that gradually acquired
a position of dignity and authority in the eyes of the profession.
The Year Books have a crystallized law to deal with. They are,
in the main, technical expositions of the words and letters of this
law. We no longer hear "no wrong without a remedy"; we
are more apt to find "damnum absque injuri--harm inflicted
without the violation of any technical legal rule. The only
instrumentality at hand for the improvement of law is the legal
fiction. It is used to give the court jurisdiction in many cases
not Originally contemplated in writs, especially cases involving
title to property.
From the fourteenth century to the end of the eighteenth, but
particularly in the middle of this period, the second of Maine's
instrumentalities is at work-equity. The chancellor's office at
the beginning of the period is concerned rather with petitions of
grace and the bestowing of boons on loyal subjects of the king
than with the improvement of the law; and at the end of the
period, in the days of Hardwicke and Thurlow, it is collecting
precedents and formulating doctrines. The middle of the period
is the time when with "conscience" as a key-word, equity is
most potent in supplementing the law. And the spirit of equity
is not confined to the chancellor's chambers; for even in the
courts of law, the formulation and application of general prin-
ciples is going on apace, and commentators begin to work out
the principles that underlie the godless jumble. Littleton-even
if he did not write the most perfect book that mankind has ever
produced, as Coke would have us believe-did bring order out of
chaos. Coke spawned maxims, but he did it in an unconscious
endeavor to make principles out of rules. Holt and Mansfield
borrow from the general understandings of men to enlarge the
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law. Blackstone, the greatest of commentators, states the sum
total of this law so satisfactorily that even the mighty wrath of
Bentham seems impotent to awaken his countrymen to the need
of further change in the law. Then comes an end to the pos-
sibility of extensive growth by the administration of general
principles. Equity is entrusted to the keeping of the most
deliberate of conservatives, the Earl of Eldon. To him equity
is a system as rigid as the law itself.
In the i8oo's, both in England and in America, the ordinary
means for the improvement of law and for keeping it abreast
the times has been legislation. Of course, legislation had been
used sparingly throughout the equity period. But prior to the
nineteenth century it was looked upon as something exceptional,
called forth either by a great upheaval to sweep away accumu-
lated evils, as under Henry VIII and in the Commonwealth, or
by a desire to check evil practices discovered from time to time,
as in the days of the Restoration. In the last hundred years, on
the other hand, legislation has come to be a normal, continuing,
part of the government's business. To-day our legislators are
pouring it forth in greater quantities than ever before.
There are signs that we are reaching the end of this legislative
activity. Not only do we hear persistent outcries against "too
many laws," but we are already making rapid progress in the
work of codification. What has been done here and in England
in the law of partnership, negotiable instruments, sales, ware-
house receipts, bills of lading, criminal law, pleading and various
other branches suggests that we may expect more and more of
the authority of the digest to be transferred to the code.
Whether with the code before us we shall lose our habit of tam-
pering with private law at every session of the legislature and
turn again to literalism and to fictions as they have done in
Germany remains to be seen. In one branch of law which, for
political reasons, was codified a century or more before the period
of general codification into which we are passing, we have
already followed this very course. Constitutional law in this
country has heretofore been almost exclusively word-study. It
has brought with it its crop of fictions.2 7 We may to-day be
ready for equity so far as the interpretation of the Constitution
is concerned. May not the broader view of principles that Pro-
fessor Frankfurter calls "realism" and Dean Pound "sociolog-
165 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 672.
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ical jurisprudence" be the appeal from the text to common sense,
from the letter to the spirit, from jus strictune to equity? "If,"
says Professor Frankfurter, "the point of view laid down in this
case2 " be sedulously observed in the argument and disposition
of constitutional cases, it is safe to say that no statute which has
any claim to life will be stricken down by the courts.1
2 9
STATUS LAW ACCOMPANIES CODIFICATION
If, now, we glance over these periods of Anglo-American legal
history with standardized and unstandardized relations in mind,
three places stand out as centers of standardizing, of status, we
may say. They are the period of Domesday Book, the period
of King Edward's Quo Warranto inquests, 0 and, so far as we
can foresee, the period we are entering upon. Our "franchises"
are not being catalogued, but our land titles are being registered,
our business relations defined, our contracts made for us, our
right to engage in ever so many kinds of business made the sub-
ject of a state license. Our partnerships, more or less contrac-
tual, are being displaced by uniform corporations organized under
general laws: and corporate powers are purely affairs of status,
though there was a time when even these looked more like mat-
ters of contract between the state and the incorporators. Our
rights are rapidly being converted into types of rights, just as in
the day of Edward I the remedies of Englishmen were types of
remedies. The remedies seemed the more important then,
though we naturally speak of the situation in terms of rights.
But rights and remedies are obverse and reverse of the same
coin; the standardizing of relations and the crystallization of
law are aspects of the same movement. There is nothing sur-
prising, then, in the fact that the periods of the codification or
'People v. Schweindler Press (i915) 214 N. Y. 395, decided under the
influence of Muller v. Oregon (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. 412.
(1916) 29 HARv. L. Rxv. 366. Cf. the conclusion of Edward S. Cor-
win's paper on Social Insurance and Constitutional Limitations (917) 26
YALE LAw JouRNAL 443: "In other words, constitutional 'rigorism' is at
an end."
'I have purposely avoided the convenient word "feudalism" here to
cover the status law of the middle ages. It is true that its typical product,
the manor, placed every man in some kind of status. But this did not
spring into existence spontaneously, nor was it uniform throughout
Europe when it did appear, save in this, that it represented a high degree
of standardizing of relations.
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crystallization of the law coincide with the extreme points
reached by the pendulum in the direction of standardizing. The
pendulum swings across the diameter of the cycle.
INDIVIDUALITY OF CONTRACTS FOSTERED BY EQUITY
Conversely, the periods of greatest individual liberty in the
shaping of contracts and of relations in general lie somewhere
between these periods of standardizing. The nineteenth century
witnessed the end of a long period of this kind. For its begin-
nings, we must go back at least to the 16oo's, to the days when
even one's relations with the government were sought to be
reduced to contract rather than status; to the creation of
indebitatus assumpsit; to the days when the chancellors invented
specific performance to take the place of cut and dried remedies,
and when they sought in the actual meeting of free minds rather
than in the form of the contract the basis of their adjudications. 3'
This ignoring of forms is the triumph of the contract principle
within the history of contracts.82  Where the few types of rela-
tions that the law can conceive of are found inadequate, equity
permits of endless variety through its creature, the trust. We
reach the end of the swing away from status when we find equity
dealing with each case on its own merits, refusing even to
recognize precedents,s" as against law dealing with cases by
' Of course, there are decrees of the chancellor that seem to prohibit
certain classes of contract, just as there is legislation that tends to estab-
lish freedom of contract. Such legislation simply formulates the spirit
of the pre-statutory period, as in the case of our constitutions. And the
attitude of the chancellors who abhorred forfeitures and penalties as well
as contracts made under undue influence is quite reconcilable with their
endeavor to get at the substance and ignore the form of the contract.
It must be remembered, for example, that in law, the mortgage was an
instrument for the creation of a status-an estate upon condition-and
that the chancellors practically resolved it into a contract.
" We may see a parallel case in the consensual contract, developed under
the Roman praetors, as contrasted with the older business with copper
and scales, which it effectually supplanted-though we can no longer say
with Savigny and Maine that the one grew out of the other. A corre-
sponding development in Jewish legal history is suggested in 65 U. op
PA. L. REv. 757.
' The beginning of precedents in equity is illustrated in a colloquy
referred to in John William Wallace, Reporters (4th ed.) 23, 303.
Vaughan, C. J., "I wonder to hear of citing precedents in matters of
Equity; for if there be Equity in a case, that Equity is an universal truth,
and there can be no precedent in it . . . Bridgman, Ld. Keeper,
"Precedents are very necessary and useful to us."
STANDARDIZING OF CONTRACTS
classes. If we would seek another period of triumph for the
contract principle in English law, we must go back to the day&
when writs were forming, to the beginning of the thirteenth
century. There are found donees of land changing their status
by the use of the word "assigns".3 ' At this point, the various
forms of Jewish gages were being invented and freely intro-
duced. And here, strangely enough, even in government a sort
of precursor of the social contract theory was suggested in the
wresting of Magna Carta from King John, and poorer charters
from better kings. Thus, equity periods are connected with the
impetus from status to contract, as strict law is with a movement
in the other direction. Neither is a "progressing backward."
SOCIAL ENFRANCHISEMENT THROUGH STATUS LAW
The movement toward status law clashes, of course, with the
ideal of individual freedom in the negative sense of "absence of
restraint" or laissez faire. Yet, freedom in the positive sense
of presence of opportunity is being served by social interference
with contract. There is still much to be gained by the further
standardizing of the relations in which society has an interest,
in order to remove them frdm the control of the accident of
power in individual bargaining. The new school of jurispru-
dence has a great work before it in educating the courts. It must,
indeed, dispel the fear of status as an archaic legal institution
which we have outgrown. It will not be compelled, however, to
unteach what little the courts have learned directly or indirectly
from Sir Henry Maine, or to unmake history. It will, on the
contrary, simply be moving along with the current of legal
development in resorting to status as an instrument at this par-
ticular time for the further enfranchisement of those to whom
freedom of contract has become a mere mockery. Freedom of
contract is not synonymous with liberty, nor is status slavery.
But we must remember that the knife can cut both ways. In
the last period of jus strictum, say the 1300's, status law was
being used to drive laborers to their work; now it is looked to
to force employers to a realization of their social duties. It
then practically created a maximum wage; to-day it is the mes-
senger of a minimum wage. The law that compelled a man to
work at the trade that he had learned is not so different in prin-
ciple from one that would have a man learn the trade at which he
proposes to work. Thus, either law may create the status of
"2 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. 13, 14 n. I, 311.
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being a plumber. Something like a trader's status may be
restored. Regrating, engrossing and forestalling may once more
become commercial crimes of the first order, and a justum
pretium may be tried in spite of all the demonstrations of the
orthodox economists to the contrary. We are indeed going back
to the principles of the Year Books in the law of public service,
and who can say where the boundaries of public service will
finally be drawn? Social legislation may not stop at supervision;
the state may take over many of our private enterprises. But
when juristic thought and practice are thoroughly socialized, will
the great end of law be accomplished, and the sociological theory
be the last word on jurisprudence? Or will a reaction set in,
whereby our new statutes will be ground to powder by legal
fictions and reconstructed by equity-until the law will seek to
serve each man according to his need once more? 8
' The causes that contribute to the predominance of one or another of
the schools of jurisprudence in different times and places are the subject
of a study by the present writer entitled "A Marshalling of the Schools
of Jurisprudence" scheduled to appear in I-wv. L. REv., January, 1918.
